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On 15 August 1950, just as India was celebrating its third independence anniversary, an earthquake of 
8.6 magnitude struck the remote north-eastern state of Assam and its surrounding borderlands. Rivers 
came out of their bed and landslides blocked Himalayan valleys, destroying towns, villages, roads, 
fields, and tea gardens in their wake. Beyond the disaster’s shattering impact on the physical geography 
of the region, this paper explores how it participated in another reconfiguration — that of Assam’s place 
within India’s political geography and national imaginary. The Indian public had hitherto known very 
little about India’s remote ‘north-east frontier’; the cataclysm and subsequent relief measures served to 
carve out a space for it on Indian mental maps. Simultaneously, by forcing a large-scale encounter 
between Indian authorities and the people of the scarcely controlled eastern Himalayas, post-earthquake 
relief and rehabilitation led to unprecedented state expansion in this newly strategic borderland. Yet in 
the same breath, the aftermath of the disaster fuelled stereotypes about Assam and its hinterland that 
would eventually further their marginality within India and undermine their continued unity. The 
crystallisation of Assam’s image as a place irreducibly subject to the whims of nature, and more 
importantly incapable of taking care of itself (and hence, of its highland dependencies), would poison 
centre-state relations for decades to come. Imperfect and contradictory, the re-ordering of this border 
space from a colonial frontier to a component of independent India’s national space did not end 
marginality, but instead reinforced it. 
 
Introduction 
 
15 August 1950 had begun auspiciously for India. The country was celebrating the third 
anniversary of independence, and with the promulgation of the Constitution and the 
establishment of the Republic on 26 January, many considered that freedom had come in 
earnest. The mood was not so buoyant in Assam, India’s easternmost state — its Chief 
Minister, Gopinath Bardoloi, had passed away on 5 August,1 and the region was still reeling 
from partition riots in the spring.2 Anticipation was in the air, nonetheless. In January, the 
Assam Rail Link, a railway track passing through the narrow land isthmus between Sikkim, 
Bhutan and East Bengal, had been inaugurated. Snapped by the creation of Pakistan three 
years before, the terrestrial connection between Assam and the rest of India had been revived. 
Meanwhile, in the scarcely administered eastern Himalayan regions that officially belonged 
to Assam, Indian authorities had just completed their first major infrastructure project, the 
Lohit Valley Road. Where previously only a dangerous hiking trail existed between the small 
town of Sadiya, in the Brahmaputra Valley, and Walong, India’s last outpost near the Tibetan 
border, the two were now connected by road. Then disaster struck. 
 
1 ‘Eminent leader’s sad end due to thrombosis of heart’, Amrita Bazaar Patrika (7 August 1950); ‘All Assam 
in mourning: 20,000 people attend funeral of Sri Bardoloi at Gauhati’, Amrita Bazaar Patrika (8 August 1950). 
2 Nehru, Jawaharlal (c1985-). Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947-1964, ed. by G. Parthasarathi, Jawaharlal 
Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, see letters for March-May 1950. 
 
 2 
That evening, as celebrations were on the wane, a quake of 8.6 magnitude struck Assam, 
Tibet, and northern Burma.3 Located in an area where the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates 
collide, the region was no stranger to earthquakes. In the previous fifty years, it had 
experienced no less than ten strong earthquakes, most of which had caused significant 
damage to property. The last one had taken place just a year before, in July 1949.4 Yet one 
had to go back to the late 19th century to find an earthquake of comparable magnitude. For 
two minutes on the 12th of June 1897, another tremor of 8.7 on the Richter scale had shaken 
Lower Assam — killing some 1500 people, levelling masonry buildings, blocking the roads, 
and damaging the courts, schools, circuit houses, and Christian missions that had marked the 
entrenchment of colonial presence in the region.5 Tom La Touche, an officer from the 
Geological Survey of India, had toured the Goalpara District to evaluate the extent of the 
damage. In some places, he had noted to his horror that ‘[n]early all the houses […] are half 
buried, up to the eaves in sand and mud which was thrown out from cracks in the ground, and 
it is a wonder that most of the people were not buried.’6 The architecture of Shillong and 
other Assam towns had changed after the catastrophe: houses began to be built ‘in the 
Japanese way’ — with a wooden framework and plaster walls — thought to be aseismic.7 
Yet if the 1897 disaster was bad enough, the 1950 earthquake was a cataclysm of even 
greater proportions. At the time, the latter ranked as the fifth biggest tremor ever recorded.8 
Newspapers likened it to a gigantic atomic bomb.9 But on the ground, the situation rather 
resembled a tsunami being unleashed on Upper Assam. For no less than seven minutes, a 
length of time that must have seemed an eternity to the inhabitants, forty-one tremors shook 
the earth. In these seven minutes, monsoon-gorged rivers came out of their bed, and massive 
landslides blocked Himalayan valleys. Tremors then subsided. But the worst was yet to 
come. When these natural dams burst, the water engulfed the countryside, and rivers in spate 
 
3 'Upper Assam cut off', Times of India (17 August 1950). 
4 This corresponds to earthquakes of a magnitude higher than 7 on the Richter scale: 1906, 1908, 1918, 1923, 
1930, 1931, 1932, 1943, 1947, and 1949. (Note that due to technologies available at the time, the stated 
magnitude of the earlier earthquakes is likely an approximation.) Due to the collision between the Indian and 
Eurasian plates and subduction in the Patkai range on the border with Burma, Northeast India is one of the sixth 
most active regions in the world for earthquakes. Earthquake zoning maps of India place the entire region today 
called ‘Northeast India’ under Zone V, the area where the earthquake hazard is greatest. The only other parts of 
India to fall under that designation are the Rann of Kuch and small parts of Jammu & Kashmir, Uttarkhand, and 
Himachal Pradesh. See M.P. Tiwari (2002). Status of seismicity in Northeast India and earthquake disaster 
mitigation, ENVIS Bulletin: Himalayan Ecology & Development, 10: 
http://gbpihedenvis.nic.in/html/vol10_1/vol10_1.htm [accessed 18 December 2013]. 
5 For more information, consult Government of Assam (1897). Report on the earthquake of the 12th June 
1897, so far as it affected the Province of Assam, n.p., Calcutta; Basil C. Allen (1905). Assam district gazetteer: 
Goalpara, Vol.III, Baptist Mission Press, Calcutta, pp.10-13; Basil C. Allen (1905). Assam district gazetteer: 
Kamrup, Vol.IV, Baptist Mission Press, Calcutta, pp.14-15; P.H. Moore (1982 [1901]). Twenty years in Assam, 
or Leaves from my journal, Omsons Publications, Guwahati, pp.157-59; and Tirthankar Roy (2009). State, 
society and market in the aftermath of natural disasters in colonial India: A preliminary exploration, Indian 
Economic Social History Review, 45:2, 276-77. 
6 Quoted in Roger Bilham (2008). Tom La Touche and the Great Assam Earthquake of 12 June 1897: Letters 
from the epicenter, Seismological Research Letters, 79:3, pp. 426-37. 
7 Mary Thatcher (1979). Interview with Florence Meiklejohn on 17 July 1979 at the Centre of South Asian 
Studies, Cambridge: http://www.s-asian.cam.ac.uk/archive/audio/meiklejohn.html [accessed 20 November 
2013]. 
8 'Violent earthquake rocks Eastern India', Times of India (17 August 1950). In retrospect, it ranks as the tenth 
strongest earthquake since 1900. U.S. Geological Survey (2014). Largest earthquakes in the world since 1900: 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/10_largest_world.php  [accessed 18 March 2014]. 
9 'Assam earthquake released 1,000,000 times more energy than atom bomb', The Assam Tribune (28 April 
1951). 
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changed their course.10 Villages and urban centres were levelled, standing crops were 
submerged, transport and communications networks were shattered. In a short period of time, 
the physical map of north-eastern India had been refashioned by a natural disaster.  
This paper explores how the earthquake and its aftermath participated in two other 
reconfigurations — that of Assam’s political geography as well as its place within India’s 
national imaginaries. In the process, it also suggests that changing representations of India’s 
national space in the early independence period served to create and reinforce, rather than 
erase, new forms of marginality. 
As events that seemingly strike people and place unpredictably and irrespective of political 
or socio-economic boundaries, natural disasters may not, on the face of it, be likely 
candidates for state-making and nation-building. Yet, while modern political history has little 
to say about natural catastrophes in contrast to man-made ones, a burgeoning historiography 
shows that such disasters are anything but apolitical.11 Not only are they a ‘sudden, 
exogenous, and unexpected destruction of state capacity’;12 but they also represent ‘breaches 
[…] in the normality of nature [which] given the often unconscious link societies make 
between the natural and socio-political orders, a breach in the common understanding of what 
nature is and does has consequences across other realms of thought and behaviour’.13 
Under the guise of a crisis, natural disasters actually offer an important opportunity to re-
order society and build political legitimacy. Indeed, in Japan, ‘the opportunity [offered by 
earthquakes] to reorder society is unparalleled by any other historical event except perhaps 
war’.14 Earthquakes did not just accompany the emergence of modern Japan in the Meiji era. 
Attempts to predict them, to manage their aftermath, or to create quake-proof architecture 
served as catalysts for nation-building, Japanese nativism, and a certain presence of the state 
in society — to the point where the Japan became ‘an emergency-oriented state’.15 Viewed 
from another angle, the importance of a particular earthquake is socially and culturally 
constructed, rather than a mere function of its magnitude or of the devastation it brings. 
Earthquakes had befallen Japan for millennia before it became characterised as an 
‘earthquake country’ through the gaze of foreign visitors.16 And it is not just in ‘earthquakes 
countries’ that natural disasters are invested with political and cultural significance. In India 
itself, the aftermath of the 2001 Kachch earthquake in Gujarat led to a pitched battle between 
secularist and right-wing Hindu parties over Kachch’s regional landscape and identity.17 As 
the case of Assam shall demonstrate, the opportunity to turn earthquakes into ‘knowledge-
making’ objects18 is particularly big in border spaces. 
A variety of written archives help us reconstruct the aftermath of the Assam earthquake. 
Much of the material comes from the Home and External Affairs Ministries, the latter being 
particularly involved in relief and reconstruction after the disaster on account both of 
international donations and of its administrative responsibility for Assam’s Himalayan tracts. 
 
10 See for instance ‘Upper Assam cut off’; and 'River Dihang overruns towns of Upper Assam', Times of 
India (21 August 1950). 
11 Gregory K. Clancey (2006). The Meiji earthquake: Nature, nation, and the ambiguities of catastrophe, 
Modern Asian Studies, 40:4, 911–12.  
12 Roy, State, society and market, p.264. 
13 Clancey, The Meiji earthquake, p.917. 
14 Janet Borland (2006). Capitalising on catastrophe: Reinvigorating the Japanese state with moral values 
through education following the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake, Modern Asian Studies, 40:4, p.875. 
15 Gregory K. Clancey (2006). Earthquake nation: The cultural politics of Japanese seismicity, 1868-1930, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, p.4. 
16 Clancey, Earthquake nation, Chapter 2. 
17 Edward Simpson & Stuart Corbridge (2006). The geography of things that may become memories: The 
2001 earthquake in Kachchh-Gujarat and the politics of rehabilitation in the pre-memorial era, Annals of the 
Association of American Geographers, 96:3, pp.566-585. 
18 Clancey, Earthquake nation, p. 4. 
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Documents from the NEFA Secretariat, now held at the Arunachal Pradesh State Archive in 
Itanagar, complement this picture. Influential English-speaking dailies from western and 
eastern India — The Times of India, Amrita Bazaar Patrika, The Statesman — as well as the 
most popular newspaper in Assam, the Guwahati-based Assam Tribune, constitute another 
mine of information, not just about the disaster but about its impact on representations of 
Assam. The private and published papers of key individuals and institutions — Nehru, 
Verrier Elwin, the former governor of Assam Sri Prakasa, or the Assam Pradesh Provincial 
Congress — provide the last major source of material. 
This paper argues that the 1950 earthquake represents a significant juncture in the 
evolution of Assam into the seven states of ‘North-East India’ — as the region is now known. 
On the one hand, the disaster and the relief measures that followed it carved out a space for 
the state and its Himalayan borderlands on Indian mental maps, where previously the region 
had largely been sidelined or considered an appendix of Bengal. By forcing a large-scale 
encounter between Indian administration and the communities of the hitherto scarcely 
controlled Assam Himalayas, the same relief measures led to an unprecedented movement of 
state expansion in this strategic borderland. Yet, in the same process, the aftermath of the 
disaster fuelled stereotypes about Assam that would eventually further marginalise it within 
India and undermine its continued unity. The crystallisation of the image of India’s north-
eastern borderlands as a place irreducibly subject to the whims of nature, and even more 
importantly incapable of taking care of itself (and, therefore, of taking care of its highland 
dependencies), would poison centre-state relations for decades to come. Imperfect and 
contradictory, the re-ordering of this borderland – from a colonial frontier to a part of 
independent India’s national space – did not end marginality, but instead reinforced it. 
 
India’s mental maps redrawn 
 
Just a week before the earthquake, the freshly departed governor of the state, Sri Prakasa, had 
mused at 
 
How few of us, educated men and women, know anything about Assam—and among those who know so little 
about this fair State, one is incline to include the Assamese themselves. It is curious—but it is a fact—that 
Assam has played little part in our thoughts. It has nested quietly in its native hills and dales, and has neither 
cared to advertise itself nor have any others worried to do so for her.19 
 
Several factors played into Assam’s relative invisibility, starting with its geographic 
distance from the rest of the sub-continent and its nature (from that sub-continent’s 
perspective) as a ‘historically “transitional” region’.20 Centred around the long, narrow 
valleys of the Brahmaputra and Surma Rivers, Assam also encompassed the eastern 
Himalayas, the highlands between India and Burma, and the hills on the northern edge of the 
 
19 ‘Our eastern frontier: Its safety and its service’, S.No.11, Sri Prakasa Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum & 
Library [hereafter NMML], New Delhi.  
20 Sanghamitra Misra (2011). Becoming a borderland: The politics of space and identity in colonial north-
eastern India, Routledge, New Delhi, p.1. Note that this characterisation should not create assumptions of 
Assam as a functioning, harmonious melting pot. Misra and others have explored the competing and contested 
identity narratives that flourished in Assam in the colonial period and continue to do so today, for instance: an 
‘Assamese’ drive to make the history of Assam congruent with the history of Assamese-speaking people 
(Jayeeta Sharma (2011). Empire's garden: Assam and the making of India, Permanent Black, Ranikhet); the 
resistance of Goalpara’s inhabitants to attempts to standardise their oral and literary tradition under ‘Assamese’ 
(Sanghamitra Misra (2006). Redrawing frontiers: Language, resistance and the imagining of a Goalparia people, 
Indian Economic and Social History Review, 43:2, pp.199-225); or the current affirmation of an Ahom identity 
in Upper Assam (Yasmin Saikia (2004). Fragmented memories: Struggling to be Tai-Ahom in India, Duke 
University Press, Durham, NC). 
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Bengal plains. This was, and still is, an area of extreme cultural, linguistic, social, and ethnic 
diversity, whose ‘links with the imagined core of Indian history were less significant than 
those with other areas’, particularly Tibet, Bhutan and the Southeast Asian highlands.21 The 
two most spoken languages in the region, Assamese and Bengali, belong to the Indo-Aryan 
family, but they are native to the plains only; the mountainous areas that cover most of the 
region are characterised by an array of Tibeto-Burman, Tai-Kadai, and Austro-Asiatic 
languages. This linguistic diversity is rooted in numerous migration waves, big and small, 
which have seen people of various backgrounds (Tai, Tibetan, Bodo, north Indian Brahmin, 
to cite but a few) move and settle across the region. Most of it is home to ‘tribal’ (Scheduled 
Tribes) populations. Islam and Hinduism prevail in the Brahmaputra and Surma Valleys 
while the highlands are home to animist religions, small Buddhist communities and, since the 
colonial period, Christianity. 
Assam’s status as a border space had only been enhanced in the colonial period, when it 
became the ‘North-East Frontier’ of India. The region had been among the last to be 
conquered by the British Raj, which had done so only in a piecemeal and rudimentary 
fashion. Assam proper, i.e. the Brahmaputra valley, had been ceded by the Burmese in 1826, 
but most of the highlands were not annexed until the last decade of the nineteenth century. 
Even so, the province remained loosely integrated, both internally and with the rest of India. 
Unlike the North-West Frontier, it was not considered of geo-strategic importance, and 
extensive portions of territory, particularly on the Himalayan slopes and the Patkai Hills 
along the Burma border, remained uncontrolled even in 1947. A panoply of exceptions to the 
rule of undivided colonial jurisdiction created an ‘internal frontier of British rule, not only a 
physical line but a demarcation of the various realms of transitional sovereignty’.22 Only in 
the twin valleys of the Brahmaputra and the Surma did Assam come under strong colonial 
control. There, the region became a frontier for capital and labour, due to the phenomenal 
growth of tea production and, later on, of oil and coal extraction. As often as not, European 
planters held the reins in the face of the limited presence and ability of colonial authorities.23 
Soon, it had turned into one of the most profitable provinces in colonial India. And yet, both 
because this was a two-tier economy and because most of the proceeds accrued to Bengal — 
the province hosting the industry’s headquarters — Assam did not benefit from this 
prosperity.24 These economically unequal relations between Bengal and the North-East 
Frontier might have played into a broader phenomenon: the tendency, at least among colonial 
administrators, to see and even treat Assam as an administrative and cultural appendix of 
Bengal.25 As a result, the dynamics of global uneven capitalist development enforced 
Assam’s situation on the margins of empire and emerging national consciousness, as a place 
of extraction and political backwardness.26  
 
21 Misra, Becoming a borderland, p. 12. 
22 Peter Robb (1997). The colonial state and constructions of Indian identity: An example on the Northeast 
frontier in the 1880s, Modern Asian Studies, 31:2, p.250. 
23 David Ludden (2012). Spatial inequity and national territory: Remapping 1905 in Bengal and Assam, 
Modern Asian Studies, 46:3, p.19. 
24 Amalendu Guha (2006). Planter-raj to swaraj: Freedom struggle and electoral politics in Assam, 1826-
1947, 2nd Edition, Indian Council of Historical Research, New Delhi. 
25 This was partly for linguistic reasons, as Assamese and Bengali belong to the same language and both use 
the Eastern Nagari script, and partly for historical reasons — the Raj having wrested Assam from the Burmese 
largely to protect Bengal. Until the late 19th century, the region had come under the Bengal Presidency and 
vernacular schools were in Bengali. Even after its constitution as a separate province in 1874 and the founding 
of Assamese-speaking schools, Bengali-speakers (predominantly based in the heavily populated Sylhet District) 
were the largest community in Assam. For more information, see H. K. Barpujari (1977). Political history of 
Assam, Vol.I: 1826-1919, Government of Assam, Guwahati; and Arun Chandra Bhuyan (1978). Political 
history of Assam, Vol.II: 1920-1939, Government of Assam, Guwahati. 
26 See Guha, Planter Raj to swaraj; and Ludden, Remapping 1905 in Bengal and Assam. 
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[Place figure 1 near here] 
Figure 1. India’s north-eastern borderlands 
 
The Assamese intelligentsia that had emerged under colonial rule had long chafed at this 
absence of the region from India’s mental maps.27 Ever since Anundram Borooah in 1877, 
Assamese nationalists had tried to carve out a respectable place for Assam in Indian 
civilisation by locating it within Vedic and epic geographies.28 Some even attempted to prove 
that, far from peripheral to it, Assam was in fact the cradle of Aryan-ness (the ancient 
Kingdom of Pragjyotisha was, after all, mentioned in the Mahabharata).29 Yet these attempts 
to subvert the ‘discursive hierarchy of Indian-ness’ had found little audience in the rest of 
India.30 The partition of British India only worsened Assam’s geographic and psychological 
isolation. With eastern Bengal going to Pakistan, the region was left hanging by a thread to 
the rest of the country: ninety-nine percent of its borders were now international.31 Concluded 
nine months prior to the earthquake, debates in the Constituent Assembly had underscored 
for many Assamese representatives just how marginal their province was. Furious at the lack 
of knowledge and interest in Assam evinced by his colleagues and at Delhi’s refusal to 
increase the funds allotted to his state, the former Assam Prime Minister Syed Muhammad 
Saadulla had bitterly complained that ‘the present [constitutional] set-up’ would return 
Assam to the status of ‘Cinderella of all Indian Provinces’.32  
Then, on 15 August 1950, the earthquake struck. 1,500 people lost their lives that day. 
Hundreds of thousands more were affected. Damage to property and land was immense: in 
Upper Assam, 1,671 villages over a 6,500 square miles zone were inundated;33 12,000 
buildings, including 2,000 granaries, were destroyed in North Lakhimpur District alone, and 
urban centres lay partly in ruins, almost all their earthen buildings damaged.34 In Dibrugarh, 
ninety percent of the buildings would require massive repairs, including those of important 
companies. 50,000 of the town’s inhabitants slept in the open, in the fear of constant 
aftershocks that could still be felt in November. Standing crops were washed away, and 
transport connections severed — the section of the Assam Trunk Road between Khowang 
and Barburua was sunk and torn over several miles, and many lesser roads were under water. 
Upper Assam was left with the wireless radio as its sole link to the outside world.35  
 
27 Sharma, Empire's garden. 
28 Boddhisattva Kar (2004). What is in a name? Politics of spatial imagination in colonial Assam, Omeo 
Kumar Das Institute of Social Change and Development, Guwahati, pp.20-36. 
29 See for instance politician Tarun Ram Phookan’s opening address to the 1926 AICC Gauhati session, 
which stressed Assam’s ties with, and contribution to, the Indian civilisation. A. M. Zaidi & S. Zaidi eds. 
(1980). Encyclopaedia of the Indian National Congress, Vol.IX: 1925-29: India demands independence, S. 
Chand, New Delhi, pp.95-103. Assam Prime Minister Gopinath Bardoloi’s address to the same body twenty-
three years later echoes it strongly. Speech delivered at the AICC session of May 1949 in Dehra Dun, S.No.1, 
Gopinath Bardoloi Papers (1930-50), NMML, New Delhi. 
30 Kar, What’s in a name?, p.21. 
31 The border with West Bengal is approximately 65 kilometres wide, whereas the seven states share 5087 
kilometres of borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, and Burma. For more information on these international 
borders, see Ministry of Development of North-Eastern Region (n.d.). International Border, Look East Policy 
vis-à-vis NER: http://www.mdoner.gov.in/content/international-border [accessed 18 March 2014]. 
32 Government of India (1947). Syed Muhammad Saadulla’s address, Session of Friday 18 July 1947, 
Constituent Assembly Debates (Proceedings) 1946-50, Vol.IV: 14-31 July 1947, p.682: 
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/debates.htm [accessed 11 January 2014]. 
33 'Road communications in Assam being restored', Amrita Bazar Patrika (25 August 1950). 
34 Lok Sabha Statement by Nehru, reported in 'Indo-Tibetan boundary: "No change to be permitted"', Times 
of India (21 November 1950). 
35 '90 pc of buildings badly damaged ', Times of India (19 August 1950). 
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To make things worse, Assam’s limited but vital industrial sector, concentrated in the area, 
was directly affected. At the heart of the oil and tea industry, the towns of Digboi and Doom 
Dooma lay in ruins, leaving three hundred families homeless.36 The bridge on the Buri 
Dihing, essential to the transport of oil, had been washed away;37 and erosion caused by both 
quakes and floods adversely affected the quality of topsoil, causing an alarmist tone to prevail 
regarding the future of the tea industry.38 As for Upper Assam’s food requirements, the 
procurement situation looked critical: fields and crops lay under several inches of water.39 
Provisional figures estimated the loss from the earthquake at a hundred million rupees.40  
A disaster of unprecedented brutality and spectacular nature had befallen India’s north-
eastern borderlands. And ironically, it succeeded where the efforts and protestations of 
Assamese politicians had failed: in the weeks and months that followed the disaster, Assam 
suddenly turned into a tangible space for Indians across space, time, and social divisions. 
Official calls for help in the aftermath of the disaster served as a pedagogical introduction to 
the region. ‘Look at the map of India,’ said Nehru in an All-India Radio broadcast on 9 
September 1950: ‘you will find Assam on the north-eastern corner bordering Tibet and China 
and Burma and Pakistan’.41  
This new interest in Assam found its materialisation in post-earthquake relief efforts. 
Fuelled by unprecedented popular sympathy, relief began pouring in. Help in cash and kind 
gathered in from all parts of the country, harnessed through the Prime Minister’s Assam 
Relief Fund and the Governor’s Earthquake Relief Fund, and whipped up by constant appeals 
in the press and by organisations such as the APCC.42 Public opinion was mobilising. A 
doctor from Nasik suggested sending batches of Congress volunteer workers to Assam, laden 
with food, clothing, and medical supplies. A Parsi gentleman from Bombay advocated the 
issuing of stamps, whose sales proceeds would fund relief in Assam. Stressing that the poor 
and lower classes should also be able to offer their help, another reader urged postal and 
railway authorities not to charge for parcels sent to Assam.43 
Assam’s plight echoed beyond India. A new era of international humanitarianism was 
emerging at the time, ushered by the end of the Second World War and given added fillip by 
US-Soviet antagonism.44 The earthquake stirred the international community into a frenzy of 
sympathy and humanitarian action. From Ethiopia to Lebanon, messages of sympathy poured 
in. From the available evidence, the aid given was plentiful and varied. Indian communities 
abroad — among whom it is unlikely that there were many Assamese — were among the 
first to donate. The Indian Association of Djibouti sent 5,000 rupees via the Indian Consulate 
 
36 'Widespread devastation by earthquake in Assam', Times of India (20 August 1950). 
37 'Road communications in Assam being restored'. 
38 'Assam tea gardens face ruin', Times of India (24 August 1950). Provisional estimates indicated a loss of 
rs20,000,000 for Assam’s industries. Donald F. Thomas, 'The ‘quake – and after: The task that confronts 
Assam', Times of India (14 September 1950). 
39 'Procurement in Assam: "Position critical"', Times of India (29 August 1950). 
40 'Assam ‘quake havoc: loss estimated at Rs10 crores', Times of India (26 August 1950). 
41 Jawaharlal Nehru (1993). ‘Help to victims of the earthquake’ (Broadcast to the Nation over AIR, 9 
September 1950), in Sarvepalli Gopal Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru – Second Series, Vol.XV, Jawaharlal 
Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, pp.166-70. 
42 Proceeding Books of APCC Meetings (29 August 1950 – 31 Dec 1955), S.No.25, Assam Pradesh Congress 
Committee Papers [hereafter APCC Papers], NMML, New Delhi; and APCC Proceedings 1935-55, Reel 3599, 
APCC Papers, NMML, New Delhi. 
43 See these letters to the Times of India editor: 'Assam and the Congress', Times of India (6 September 
1950); 'To the Editor (by B.H. Daroowalla)', Times of India (12 September 1950); and 'Earthquake Relief', 
Times of India (15 September 1950). 
44 See for instance Michael N. Barnett (2011). Empire of humanity: A history of humanitarianism, Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, NY; and Gerard Daniel Cohen (2012). In war's wake: Europe's displaced persons in 
the postwar order, Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York. 
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at Aden. The Addis Ababa community also contributed.45 Offers for relief poured in from 
countries such as Burma, Yemen, the USA, specialised agencies such as the Watnumull 
Foundation in San Francisco, and the United Nations.46 Even the Government of Pakistan 
contributed 440 tons of rice from East Bengal.47 Available government records do not give us 
an estimate of the funds thus donated to Assam, whether through Indian or international 
channels. But Dr Naik, a Gandhian activist working with the Bhils in Western India who 
became an Honorary Secretary of the Earthquake Relief Fund, recalls that it gathered 
approximately eleven million rupees.48  
The ‘discovery of India’ was therefore still taking place in 1950.49 Nowhere was it more 
marked than for that part of Assam most affected by the earthquake — the Assam Himalayas 
or, as they were called back then, the North-East Frontier Tracts. If the rest of India knew 
little about Assam in 1950, it knew even less about its remote and sparsely populated eastern 
Himalayan hinterland. Indeed, until the mid-1940s this mountainous, jungle-clad region 
bordering Tibet had largely stayed out of the concerns of colonial policy-makers themselves. 
Provided the local inhabitants did not raid Assam’s valuable tea gardens (in which case they 
would be ‘pacified’ through military expeditions), Shillong and Delhi had seen little promise 
in interfering in a region that was neither profitable economically nor vital strategically (or so 
they thought). Though constitutionally part of Assam, most of the hinterland had therefore 
remained un-administered, separated from ‘settled’ parts of Assam by an Inner Line beyond 
which no one but frontier officials and a few government-approved visitors were authorised 
to travel. As for ‘the communities forced to stay beyond the Line,’ they ‘were seen as 
belonging to a different time regime—where the time of the law did not apply; where slavery, 
head-hunting, and nomadism could be allowed to exist’.50 It is only during the Second World 
War, when the eastern Himalayan ‘Hump’ became crucial to Allied victory on the China-
Burma-India frontline, that the Ministry of External Affairs had decided to expand Indian 
presence in the Frontier Tracts. Even so, this expansion had only been going at a snail pace, 
the other Delhi ministries being less than convinced of the region’s importance. 
 
45 See Contribution of Rs.5,000 to the Assam Relief Fund by the Indian Association of Djibouti through the 
Commission for the Government of India in Aden (1950), 1(13)-AWT, External Affairs Proceedings, National 
Archives of India [hereafter NAI], New Delhi ; Sympathies extended by the Emperor of Ethiopia on his behalf 
and the people of Ethiopia towards the Assam earthquake sufferers. Contributions by Indian community in 
Addis Ababa (1950), 22-32-AFR-I, External Affairs Proceedings, NAI, New Delhi. 
46 See respectively, Offers of assistance from Burma towards Assam relief (1950), 48-129-BI, External 
Affairs Proceedings, NAI, New Delhi; Enquiry by the United States of America through Indian Embassy, 
Washington regarding immediate help in kind needed for the victims of the earthquake in Assam (1950), 154-
NEF, External Affairs Proceedings, NAI, New Delhi; Watnumull Foundation of San Francisco. Offer of help for 
the Assam earthquake victims (1950), 155-NEF, External Affairs Proceedings, NAI, New Delhi; Resolution in 
the United Nations Organisation regarding sympathy for the victims of earthquake in Assam. Enquiry from 
Secretary General of UNO regarding requirements which could be met by UN and other specialised agencies 
(1950), 151-NEF, External Affairs Proceedings, NAI, New Delhi; and Contribution for Assam Relief Fund by 
Aden (1951), 1(6)-AWT, External Affairs Proceedings, NAI, New Delhi. Almost none of the files regarding the 
earthquake have been transferred, unfortunately (including those giving a summary of all the relief offered). 
However it is known that the US government offered to send six tons of emergency relief supplies and 427,431 
tons of foodgrains at concessional prices. Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, p.210. 
47 Offer of contribution for relief from the Prime Minister's Relief Fund and 10,000 maunds of rice by 
Pakistani Prime Minister from East Pakistan (1950), 142-NEF, External Affairs Proceedings, NAI, New Delhi. 
48 Uma Shankar (1973). Interview with Dr. Naik on 1 May 1973 at the Centre of South Asian Studies, 
Cambridge: http://www.s-asian.cam.ac.uk/archive/audio/naikd.html  [accessed 20 November 2013]. 
49 Jawaharlal Nehru (1945). The discovery of India, Meridian Books, n.p. 
50 Boddhisattva Kar (2009). ‘When was the postcolonial? A history of policing impossible lines’, in Sanjib 
Baruah Beyond counter-insurgency: Breaking the impasse in Northeast India, Oxford University Press, New 
Delhi, pp.51-52. 
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As the Indian media started looking for the epicentre of the earthquake, a new awareness of 
the existence of the Frontier Tracts, and of their belonging to India, coalesced. Newspaper 
readers were appraised that the epicentre lay just across the Indo-Tibetan border, near the 
village of Rima — some 80 miles from a place called ‘Wolong.’51 Between this border post 
and the plains of Assam lay a vast mountainous area called, one was told, the Abor Hills and 
the Mishmi Hills, which apparently belonged to India. If such was the devastation in the 
plains of Upper Assam, what could have happened there? Rumours and suppositions were 
that the Brahmaputra River had turned black;52 that entire mountain chains had vanished or 
collapsed;53 or that uprooted trees from species unknown in India were floating down rivers 
in spate.54 
An evocative story emerged through the eyes of a figure seemingly belonging to the 
bygone colonial times — a British explorer. When disaster struck, the eastern Frontier Tracts 
hosted a singular couple: the ‘plant-hunter’ Francis Kingdon-Ward and his wife. Famous for 
discovering the mysterious gorges through which the Tibetan Tsangpo turns into the 
Brahmaputra River in the 1920s,55 Kingdon-Ward had decided to undertake another plant-
hunting trip in the eastern Himalayas. Outsiders were normally not permitted into the Frontier 
Tracts, but his celebrity status and contribution to the knowledge of the region was such that 
Indian authorities had allowed him and his wife to proceed right up to the border with Tibet. 
Now in the midst of their ‘botanizing’ spree,56 they had pitched their tent in the Lohit Valley, 
downstream of Walong, when they suddenly felt a ‘vibration so rapid […] as to suggest the 
toll of kettledrums’. Soon, everything seemed to be ‘falling down an immeasurable shaft’: 
 
Dark as it was, we could see the ridges silhouetted against the paler sky, with their fuzzy outline of dancing 
trees. The noise was terrific, petrifying, and long continued as whole hillsides, studded with pine trees, slid into 
the valley. These external clatterings quickly drowned the internal rumblings deep within the crust. But the 
strangest noises of all came at the end of the shock, when five or six consecutive explosions, all exactly alike, 
following each other at intervals of several seconds, were touched off. These muffled booms — they sounded 
like Ack-Ack shells bursting high in the sky — […] were heard on the plain of Assam 150 miles distant, and in 
Myitkina (north Burma) 200 miles away.57 
 
Kingdon-Ward’s presence in the very heart of the cataclysm provided an ideal storyline: 
the testimony of one who had seen it all. Originally printed in the Geographical Journal, the 
account’s influence might be doubtful, had it not been for the high profile that the explorer 
enjoyed in the Indian media since the 1930s, at least in the English-speaking press. The 
article came out in pamphlet form in India,58 and it is not unlikely that this narrative of the 
earthquake and the frontier percolated to an Indian audience wider than the small circles of 
botany and geography-enthusiasts.59 
 
51 In reality, the small settlement of Walong. Thomas, ‘The quake – and after’. 
52 'Brahmaputra water turns black', Amrita Bazaar Patrika (20 August 1950). 
53 'Quake affects two-thirds of Assam people: Entire hills inhabited by the Abors subside', Amrita Bazaar 
Patrika (26 August 1950); 'Mountain chains said to have vanished', Times of India (29 August 1950). 
54 Nehru, Letters to Chief Ministers, pp.196-97. 
55 Francis Kingdon-Ward. (2008 [1926]). Frank Kingdon-Ward's ‘Riddle of the Tsangpo Gorges’: Retracing 
the epic journey of 1924-25 in South-East Tibet, edited by Kenneth Cox, 2nd Edition, additional material by 
Kenneth Cox, Kenneth Storm, Jr. & Ian Baker. Garden Art Press, Woodbridge.  
56 Francis Kingdon-Ward (1953). The Assam earthquake of 1950, The Geographical Journal, 119:2, p.169.  
57 Kingdon-Ward, The Assam earthquake of 1950, p.172. 
58 A copy of it is preserved at the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, in Delhi. 
59 The Times of India thus reviewed Kingdon-Ward’s frequent books almost without fail, eagerly published 
reports of his explorations, and promoted his regular pieces for the Illustrated Weekly of India as a big selling 
point in its adverts for the magazine. See for instance 'People with a strange dialect: Assam border of Tibet', The 
Times of India (9 February 1934); 'Display Ad 7', The Times of India (21 July 1933); and 'Tibetan plants for 
museum: Rich collection', The Times of India (22 April 1936). 
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In the process, the explorer’s account may have helped to place not just the earthquake on 
the map, but India’s north-east frontier itself. Far from merely describing the cataclysm, the 
plant-hunter systematically described the Lohit Valley and its tributaries — with a flurry of 
maps — before proceeding to a detailed analysis of the disaster’s aftermath, and finally 
retelling his laborious escape from the shattered hills. With the first part of the account, the 
remote upper valley of the Lohit in the Mishmi Hills acquired a tangible geography (even as 
that geography was being wrecked); with the second one, an impressive picture of the power 
of Nature (a picture materialised in several photographs); and with the third, a classic 
ingredient to the construction of lasting impressions: a true adventure story.  
 
In this illegible space made even more illegible by a natural disaster, and which yet was 
apparently India, events and cataclysms were happening that did not come to light, but that 
affected the lives of the people in the settled area. Through the trauma and sensationalism of 
a natural catastrophe, a new awareness of one of India’s new corners was taking place. For 
the first time (and for a short moment), Indian authorities let journalists into the Frontier 
Tracts. The press reports, aerial surveys, and pictures published by the press were full of 
approximations, fantasy claims, and inaccuracies. Yet despite them — and perhaps partly 
because of them — they all participated in the carving of a niche space for the region in the 
minds of newspaper readers. Speeches like that given a week after the disaster by Jairamdas 
Daulatram, the newly installed governor of India, to mark the opening of the Governor’s 
Relief Fund, were reproduced in the Amrita Bazar Patrika and other newspapers: 
 
The State of Assam, rendered so beautiful by nature, has suffered a great calamity at the hands of the natural 
forces. One of the severest earthquakes in [the] world’s history has rocked the hills and plains of India’s North-
East Frontier. The shock has been severest in the hills and upper half of Assam […] The focus of [the] 
earthquake was just outside India’s border and the brunt of the shock has had to be received by hills which 
shelter the valley of the Brahmaputra. […] Communications in that tribal region were already non-existent. 
Those who lived or had to be on duty there as sentinels of the nation have been in the greatest danger and slowly 
news is coming in of what they have suffered.60  
 
The Frontier Tracts may have been less talked about, less thought about, less immediately 
accessible; yet it was they that provided Assam with physical shelter — albeit not an 
earthquake-proof one — and it was their inhabitants, and those serving among them, that 
were the security bulwark of the Indian nation.  
 
Relief, rehabilitation, and state expansion 
 
In other words, the 1950 earthquake accelerated the integration of Assam, and particularly its 
Himalayan borderlands, into representations of India’s national space. This re-ordering had a 
material counterpart: by causing an important humanitarian crisis, the earthquake triggered an 
unprecedented expansion of state presence in the Frontier Tracts.  
At first glance, the earthquake had been, like other modern natural disasters, a ‘sudden, 
exogenous, and unexpected destruction of state capacity’.61 The catastrophe had befallen both 
the established administrative centres of the region and the fledging outposts in the 
hinterland. Post-earthquake floods were brutal for Sadiya and Pasighat, the only two 
settlements in the Frontier Tracts that hosted a substantial administrative apparatus in 1950. 
Though heavily damaged, Pasighat slowly made a recovery. Sadiya was not so lucky. The 
 
60 'Governor’s Fund opened: Sri Daulatram’s appeal for aid to earthquake sufferers of Assam', Amrita Bazaar 
Patrika (23 August 1950). Emphasis added. 
61 Roy, State, society and market, p.264. 
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Dibang River had changed course, sealing the town’s fate.62 Eighteen months later, the 
administrative headquarters of the Mishmi Hills District were precipitously shifted higher up 
in the hills to Tezu, in the face of Sadiya’s impending sinking.63 Of this once ‘beautiful 
township’ and its ‘tree lined avenues [and] spacious bungalows,’ remained only a 
melancholic trace: the ‘iron mast of a flag pole’ in the midst of the waters of the Dibang.64  
In the hills themselves, the situation was scarcely better. The signs that had hinted at the 
presence of the Indian state lay in ruins. At Theroliang, earmarked to be an important 
administrative outpost, ‘[e]verywhere the mountains were silver as lepers with shining white 
scars, a country of death. No vestige of bridge, bungalow, sheds, or terrace remained; only 
stones and stones. One would never have suspected that this valley had ever been inhabited.’ 
Even worse, the road through the Lohit Valley, meant to become the cornerstone of Indian 
expansion into the area, was partly destroyed. In some places, the river itself was now using it 
as its bed.65   
Fledging administrative expansion in the Frontier Tracts seemed to have been stalled at 
birth. And yet, precisely because there was so little state capacity to destroy, the earthquake 
could not deal an irreparable blow to Indian presence. What had been lost were but the few 
signs that had hinted at the Indian authorities’ laborious expansion in the eastern Himalayas. 
Instead, by dramatically highlighting the existence of the region in the national and 
international press, the earthquake provided the Indian state with the opportunity to expand 
its presence locally. After several years of stunted development, the disaster whipped frontier 
administration into action. Far from being pure humanitarian enterprises, relief and 
rehabilitation became a testing ground for the state-building capabilities of the new Republic 
of India. The human suffering that the earthquake had caused turned into an opportunity to 
manifest the active, nearby, and positive presence of the Indian state to the indigenous 
inhabitants.  
‘Relief’ and ‘rehabilitation’ had long become part of the colonial state’s vocabulary in 
other parts of India. Since the late 1830s, famine management had constituted a significant 
source of state expansion and legitimisation for the Raj, which had used it to expand 
infrastructure and reinforce its structures of governance in north India.66 State responses to 
natural disasters had shifted from laissez-faire to greater state intervention somewhat later, 
between the late nineteenth and the mid twentieth centuries.67 More often than not, however, 
such relief and rehabilitation intentions failed to translate in practice.68 For the independent 
Indian state  — whose birth had been accompanied with the influx of millions of partition 
refugees — relief and rehabilitation played an even more important, and indeed constitutive, 
part in state-making and nation-building.69 The successful management of refugee 
rehabilitation was vitally important to the Nehruvian state, both to stabilise itself after the 
turmoil of partition and to assert its greater legitimacy vis-à-vis the colonial predecessor.  
Frontier Tracts authorities were authorised to incur two millions rupees worth of relief 
expenditure for the 150,000 and 75,000 people affected in the Abor and Mishmi Hills. The 
 
62 Sadiya District Congress Committee (1950-54), Packet 14 File 1, APCC Papers, NMML, New Delhi. 
63 Confidential reports on the NEFA (1952-44), S.No.111, Verrier Elwin Papers, NMML, New Delhi, ff.6-7. 
64 Tarun Kumar Bhattacharjee (1993). The frontier trail, Manick Bandyopadhyay, Calcutta, p.7. 
65 Kingdon-Ward, The Assam earthquake of 1950. 
66 Sanjay Sharma (2001). Famine, philanthropy and the colonial state: North India in the early nineteenth 
century, Oxford University Press, Delhi, Oxford. 
67 Roy, State, society and market. 
68 David Hall-Matthews (2004). Famines in (South) Asia, History Compass, 2, pp.1-5. 
69 Joya Chatterji (2007). The spoils of partition: Bengal and India, 1947-1967, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge; Vazira Fazila-Yacoobali Zamindar (2007). The long partition and the making of modern South 
Asia: Refugees, boundaries, histories, Columbia University Press, New York; Uditi Sen (2009). 'Refugees and 
the politics of nation-building in India, 1947-1971’, unpublished doctoral thesis, Cambridge University. 
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Health Ministry made a further donation of Rs19,500,000, and the Assam Government 
offered surplus clothing. Another Rs2,700,000 were obtained from the public, as well as 
further contributions from several countries and organisations.70 The importance of this 
expenditure — both in terms of the Frontier Tracts’ sparse population and of previous 
budgets for them — signals the efforts made by local authorities to shape contact with 
populations of the interior in a positive way.  
As far as the people of the mountainous hinterland were concerned, such earthquake relief 
was often the first encounter with ‘the sircar’ (the government). For some, this took the shape 
of a ‘metal bird’ (a plane) dropping much needed salt, tea, or blanket supplies from the sky; 
for others, that of an officer calling them to the new administrative centre to supply them with 
these same items, as well as kitchen utensils or agricultural implements.71 Many people from 
the farthest reaches of the Siang Valley came all the way to Pasighat to obtain relief 
commodities from the government, which they then distributed locally.72 Meanwhile district 
officers were deputed to tour the affected areas, and various departments in the agency were 
instructed to employ tribal labour to inject cash into the economy.73 
There is little doubt that local Indian authorities took the opportunities afforded by the 
earthquake seriously, not just in the eastern part of the Frontier Tracts but throughout the 
region. In Tawang, near the Bhutan border, far away from the earthquake’s epicentre, the 
administration helped repair the Buddhist monastery, showing their endorsement of the 
values and symbols of local Monpa society and cementing their burgeoning alliance with 
monastic authorities.74 Finally, the aftermath of the earthquake offered an opportunity to 
focus on a key strategy for winning the tribes over: the provision of medical help.75  
These initiatives were not always an immediate or unequivocal success. Their organisation 
was difficult given the difficult terrain and the lack of administrative presence — several 
areas were still terra incognita76 — and cases of mismanagement of funds were reported.77 
Moreover, some people came to regret coming down to the plains to collect relief: members 
of the Ramo and the Pailibo tribes, who live at high altitudes in the upper reaches of the 
Siang Basin, contracted malaria during their sojourn at Pasighat.78 Despite these failings, 
relief and rehabilitation did succeed in two key state-building dimensions. To begin with, 
they brought the Indian state and frontier populations into unprecedented contact, including 
from remote areas. They also changed the pattern of interaction between the two, colouring it 
in a positive light. Under colonial rule, state presence on the frontier had largely been defined 
in coercive terms: military promenades and punitive expeditions. By contrast, the aftermath 
of the earthquake recast the state as a (potential) provider of tangible goods and benefits.  
The unprecedented encounter between the Indian state and local society enabled by post-
earthquake relief and rehabilitation eventually paved the way for state penetration in NEFA. 
Whereas only two outposts had been opened in 1950, nine of them were founded the year 
 
70 Question in Parliament of India by Shri Kamath regarding Assam earthquake (1950), 15/87-Public, Home 
Affairs Proceedings, NAI, New Delhi. 
71 Bhattacharjee, The frontier trail, p. 35. See also 'Subansiri River back to its course', Times of India (1 
September 1950). 
72 'Relief activity in Abor Hills District', The Assam Tribune (7 February 1951). 
73 S.No.111, Verrier Elwin Papers, NMML. 
74 S.No.111, Verrier Elwin Papers, NMML. 
75 R.N. Koley (c1997). East Siang in the last fifty years (1947-1997), East Siang District administration, 
Pasighat. 
76 Tribal Areas of Assam. Expenditure on projects (1950), 146-NEF, External Affairs Proceedings, NAI, New 
Delhi, Doulatram to Keskar, 15 August 1950. 
77 Tour Diary of Assistant Political Officer Lohit, B.C. Bhuyan (1950), GA-12/50, NEFA Secretariat, 
Arunachal Pradesh State Archives [hereafter APSA], Itanagar.  
78 Malaria protection for the hill tribes coming down to the plains and plan for anti-malarial measures (1951), 
M/94/51, NEFA Secretariat, APSA, Itanagar.  
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after. In early 1951, an Assam Rifles patrol was sent to take official possession of Tawang, 
where Tibetan and Indian officials had jostled for control for years. The takeover was 
ostensibly linked to ‘earthquake relief measures.’79 This new dynamism was not limited to 
the strategic corridors of the Lohit valley and the Charduar-Tawang route. For the first time, 
frontier authorities launched expeditions in the country of the Ramo and Palibo tribes in the 
Abor Hills, and to Gusar in the upper Subansiri. A year later, a series of Assam Rifles 
outposts and administrative centres were opened in these newly explored regions. Pangin, 
Mebo, Maryang, Damro, and Mechukha were the most important of them. By 1952–53, the 
whole frontier — or, as it was becoming known, NEFA — was targeted for administrative 
expansion.80 
By then, the drive for increased state presence no longer stemmed primarily from the 
earthquake’s consequences, but from another sort of tremor: the annexation of Tibet by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Tawang’s Tibetan abbots, whose links to Lhasa 
monasteries had become a liability, were gradually replaced by Monpa clerics.81 The fear of 
China did not translate into the militarisation of Indian presence in the Frontier Tracts, 
however. By smashing down the topography of the Lohit Valley — the easternmost major 
trade and human corridor between India, China, Tibet, and Burma — the earthquake had also 
reinforced a false sense that the Himalayas formed an impassable natural frontier with Tibet. 
India seemed protected from a large-scale invasion. Therefore, the authorities’ key concern 
from then on lay rather in convincing frontier communities not to look towards China.82  
Attuned to the risk of an increased Chinese presence in the region long before 1950, 
officers in the Frontier Tracts had advocated securing the loyalty of their inhabitants through 
development facilities ever since the Second World War.83 The earthquake finally gave them 
the increased development and welfare budgets that they had long demanded. In 1952-53, a 
community project was established in Pasighat to resettle Pasi, Minyong, and Pangi evacuees 
from the interior, rehabilitating them in ‘model villages’ where the practice of wet-rice 
cultivation was introduced.84 One year later, in late 1953, Indian authorities brought in a self-
taught anthropologist, known for his strong advocacy of tribal culture and rights, to work on 
NEFA. His name was Verrier Elwin. Unlike existing frontier officials, Elwin benefited from 
a high (though not always positive) profile in the Indian media and from a close relationship 
to Nehru.85 His task would be to provide a rationale for the Indian state’s expansion on the 
frontier — a welfare and development-centric strategy of incorporation that would let the 
tribes develop ‘according to their own genius and tradition’ before joining India.86 Yet while 
it is tempting today to correlate NEFA’s incorporation into India through tribal 
developmentalism solely with Elwin, the elements of the ‘philosophy for NEFA’ had been 
established on the ground at least three years before his appointment — and it is through 
post-earthquake relief and rehabilitation efforts that they had been launched. 
 
79 Occupation of Tawang, earthquake relief measures by Major Khathing's party (1951), CGA/56/51, NEFA 
Secretariat, APSA, Itanagar.  
80 List of administrative centres in NEFA (1958), P66/58, NEFA Secretariat, APSA, Itanagar.  
81 CGA/56/51, NEFA Secretariat, APSA. 
82 'Assam Rifles post at Walong was set up in 1944', Assam Tribune (15 November 1962); 'The Himalayan 
Frontier: I – Background of quiet', Times of India (22 November 1950). 
83 G.E. Walker, ‘Blueprint for Sadiya: A post-war reconstruction plan for Sadiya Frontier Tract (1945), Mss 
Eur D1191/11, Miscellaneous papers relating to the Northeast Frontier of India, British Library [hereafter BL], 
London. 
84 Bhattacharjee, The frontier trail, pp. 64-66. 
85 Ramachandra Guha (2001). Savaging the civilized: Verrier Elwin, his tribals, and India, Oxford University 
Press, New Delhi. 
86 Verrier Elwin (1957). A philosophy for NEFA. With a foreword by the Prime Minister of India, 1st Edition, 
North-East Frontier Agency Administration, Shillong, p.11 (paraphrasing Nehru). 
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The realm of nature’s chaos and man’s mismanagement 
 
A devastating natural disaster had served to re-order India’s mental and political maps, 
stretching them in an unprecedented way to encompass its north-eastern borderlands and 
seemingly secluding them from their Tibetan hinterland. Yet while the earthquake and its 
aftermath participated in independent India’s early state-making and nation-building 
processes, they did so in a way that, instead of paving the way for Assam standing on an 
equal footing with other regions, led to the entrenchment of the region’s marginal status 
within the country. 
To begin with, representations of Assam in the major English papers outside the state did 
not take on truly positive tones. Official and press reports in the aftermath of the earthquake 
cast it as a region martyred by natural forces — forces so powerful that they could re-shape 
the crust of the earth in a whim, and even swallow up the very Dibrugarh house that had 
hosted India’s Prime Minister a month before, during his visit to Assam.87 The official report 
drafted by the Geological Survey of India after the earthquake left no doubt about this: 
 
Assam is literally known as the home of earthquakes […] This region is the most unstable in India; it lies along 
the main boundary fault line along the foot of the Himalayas and the eastern Assam ranges, and has been the 
scene of nearly a dozen major earthquakes during the last century.88  
 
Nehru pointed out that other Indian regions regularly suffered from natural catastrophes, 
and that they ‘[were] all in the same boat. Each […with] a tale of woe to tell’.89 Yet none of 
the floods experienced by other regions — even Bihar and its ‘sorrow,’ the Kosi River — 
could be compared with riparian tsunamis rolling down the Himalayan slopes, or with rivers 
simply coming out of their beds to carve out another one through the midst of a busy town. 
As the Assamese politician Hem Barua put it twelve years later, in a speech on flood control 
on the Brahmaputra: ‘[i]n Assam, Nature’s war is a perpetual affair’.90 
‘Nature’s war’ proved an influential theme in Assam-related news and discussions after 
1950. This was particularly the case in the summer months, a season when floods seemingly 
adopted a metronome-like regularity year after year.91 Some years were particularly 
devastating. In 1951, floods turned Upper Assam into ‘a vast sea of water.’92 In 1954, the 
Amrita Bazaar Patrika even reported that the major town of Dibrugarh was about to collapse 
into the Brahmaputra.93 Consequently, flood control figured prominently in Lok Sabha 
discussions on Assam. Two years after the earthquake, Nehru announced that a central team 
 
87 Jawaharlal Nehru (1993). 'The problems facing India', in Sarvepalli Gopal Selected works of Jawaharlal 
Nehru – Second Series, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi, pp.8-28 (speech at a public meeting in 
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88 A preliminary report of the Assam earthquake by M.C. Poddar, Geologist, Geological Survey of India 
(1951), 7/2-Public, Home Affairs Proceedings, NAI, New Delhi. Emphasis added. 
89 'Building anew', Times of India (14 September 1950). 
90 Hem Barua (2010). The fearless democrat: Hem Barua, edited by Deepak Kumar Das, Bhabani Print & 
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92 E.P. Gee, 'The Brahmaputra Valley is changing: Nature’s mutilation and Man's mistakes', The Assam 
Tribune (7 October 1951). 
93 See for example 'Brahmaputra erosion threatens Dibrugarh Town', Amrita Bazaar Patrika (17 July 1954). 
'Brahmaputra now a "river of grief"’, Amrita Bazaar Patrika (18 August 1954). 
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of officers deputed to report on the State’s immediate and long-term problems had 
recommended the establishment of a River Investigation Division, a four-mile long stone 
revetment to save Dibrugarh, massive embankment and drainage works, and a contour survey 
of the entire state.94 This did little to appease doomsayers like Kingdon-Ward, who warned 
that ‘[i]f all [the factors causing the floods] were adverse in any one year, the results might be 
catastrophic — so much so that Lakhimpur might become un-inhabitable, and the head of the 
Assam Valley converted into a vast swamp’.95 
This recurring characterisation of Assam as a region living to the rhythm of natural 
catastrophes participated in a long line of representations of the Brahmaputra Valley and its 
hinterland. Early colonial encounters with Assam had marked it out as the home of diseases 
— not just malaria but also the kala-azar, a mysterious but devastating epidemic that left the 
countryside depopulated.96 The trope of a singularly unhealthy province lived on in other 
forms, such as unsavoury accounts of rat plagues, rodent invasions that followed the periodic 
flowering of certain bamboo species and could destroy the entire food supply of highland 
communities.97 Not all representations of Assam were negative, however. Exotic tales of 
shikaris (hunters), in particular, formed a strong part of the imaginaries attached to the 
province.98 Thus, between April and June 1952, The Statesman dedicated but one article to 
Assam — and that was in the form of a one-page photo reportage romanticising Assam as a 
hunting ground for the rhinoceros.99 But all these narratives had one thing in common. They 
mapped out Assam as a space that was, for all the wealth of Digboi and Margherita’s tea 
plantations, the realm of Nature rather than of men.  
This was particularly evident in the ways in which the memorialisation of the earthquake 
cast the Himalayan Frontier Tracts primarily as a physical space, silencing its complex 
human landscape. Kingdon-Ward’s description of the Lohit Valley in the aftermath of the 
disaster, for instance, made but one allusion to the region being an inhabited space (‘well 
preserved terraces’), and consequently also failed to mention the human and material losses it 
had suffered.100 Only the small administrative presence and a stranded Assam Rifles party 
were mentioned. Descriptions such as these served to memorialise the Frontier Tracts as a 
space largely empty of human presence, only disturbed by the advance (or here, the epic 
struggle) of the Indian administration. 
A similar narrative slant is in evidence in official accounts of the disaster and subsequent 
relief and rescue attempts in the Frontier Tracts. One particularly dramatic episode was the 
daring rescue operations at Nizamghat, upstream of Sadiya. Immediately after the quake, this 
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small settlement inhabited by the Adi (Abor) tribe lay completely cut off from the world. 
Less than a year later the Dibang River, still reeling from the disaster, changed its course. In a 
matter of hours, a new channel had appeared. Nizamghat was encircled. The new island 
would soon be submerged; yet the current was so strong, and the weather so appalling, that 
any boat-rescue was impossible. Assisted by local planters, frontier authorities put together a 
daring mission to rescue the inhabitants from the now fast disappearing island.101 Vividly 
retold immediately after the end of the operation in an official press conference, the struggle 
to save Nizamghat's population is striking for its focus on the plight of the administrative 
staff marooned on the island and the heroism of the rescuers, at the expense of the 
experiences of the tribal population of the Nizamghat area. 
When no traumatic, newsworthy events such as floods and landslides surfaced, the 
smattering of Assam-centred articles that percolated in the English-speaking press beyond 
Assam emphasised the picturesque aspect of its ‘hills and vales,’ and the sheer excitement of 
hunting tigers or rhinoceros in its meadows — thus ensuring the permanence of north-eastern 
India’s image as a jungli place: savage, separate, and inferior.  
The earthquake also served to vindicate an idea of Assam that had began to take root in the 
preceding years: the idea of a province incapable of taking care of itself. Considered of 
secondary geo-strategic importance until World War Two, when it became a key frontline 
against Japan almost overnight, Assam was progressively acquiring a new status as India’s 
strategic frontier, both against East Pakistan and against China.102 Moreover, provincial 
authorities were trapped in a dire financial situation, worsened by the transfer of its richest 
district, Sylhet, to Pakistan and the loss of most of its trade and communications networks 
after partition. Hence, Assam quickly became characterised as a ‘problem province’ — a 
derogatory label stamped in during Constitutional Assembly discussion on state finances. Ten 
days before the earthquake, Sri Prakasa had penned an article that stressed that ‘the place 
[was] bristling with problems,’ from defence and under-developed natural resources to 
geographical isolation and divide between hills and plains.103  
The earthquake contributed to the entrenchment of the ‘problem province’ label. While 
immediate relief flowed relatively easily in a context of emergency and public sympathy, 
discussions between Central and State authorities regarding long-term relief and 
rehabilitation were much more protracted. The Assam Government drafted a Rs37,956,200 
long-term plan which, in view of its depleted finances and the scale of the disaster, required 
extensive central involvement: a three-year grant of Rs34,728,500 and a two-year loan of 
Rs3,227,700 repayable in twenty years.104 But in the post-partition context — where refugee 
rehabilitation and economic disorganisation made financial retrenchment the order of the day 
— such demands were not favourably looked upon by the Centre. In fact, they aroused 
suspicion, as the Assam Government was simultaneously resisting Central and West Bengal 
demands to share responsibility for the rehabilitation of East Bengal refugees. Such 
suspicions were likely heightened when sections of the Assamese press urged the State 
Government to use the devastation and landlessness caused by the earthquake as grounds to 
refuse to accommodate partition victims.105  
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The issue of earthquake relief soon turned acrimonious in the central Legislative 
Assembly. Rohini Kumar Chaudhury and other Assamese representatives accused Delhi of 
dithering instead of sending financial help to Assam.106 Junior members of the central 
Government, meanwhile, chastised Assam for (apparently) blaming others for its 
misfortune.107 The Calcutta- or Delhi-based papers soon followed this with accusations 
regarding the passivity of Assam’s authorities. The latter were blamed in half-veiled terms 
for creating a frenzied atmosphere on the basis of wild claims and speculations:  
 
National thinking as to recent tragic events in Assam can profit by some mental re-adjustment. There is no 
gainsaying the gravity of the havoc […] But the severity of the disaster as pictured by State spokesmen and 
represented by the radio and the press does not fully accord with reality. The generality of these reports will 
have one believe that the very earth had risen in nature’s wrath, that entire districts are missing. Volcanoes are 
reported to have revived after centuries of dormancy [...] There is a leaven of truth in some of these statements; 
but the overall picture is out of focus with the facts […] The Government machinery has shown neither the 
resilience nor the stamina one would expect in a region so prone to natural calamity. Control and co-ordination 
are conditions that are absent on the governmental plane. Shillong [the provincial capital] appears to deplore the 
disaster; but has done little positive to meet it. There is an all-too great dependent upon the District Officer 
already swamped under diversified tasks few are able to tackle […T]he will and the capacity to rehabilitate the 
afflicted people and the affected area are greater essentials to recovery than the means […] The future, 
therefore, turns on the heights to which the leadership within the State can rise in this crisis.108 
 
Critical assessments of governmental apathy were all the more credible as, ever since 
colonial rule, the primary stereotype of the Assamese as a people was that they were easy-
going and nonchalant (if the observer was in a compassionate mood) and lazy and criminally 
indolent (if she or he was not).109 ‘Yours is a land for gods to live in’, declared Vallabhai 
Patel with a speech during a visit to Shillong in January 1948, before adding: ‘get rid of your 
enemy, which is laziness.’110 Such stereotypes of Assam as the land of lahe lahe (slowly-
slowly) had likely been strengthened among India’s nationalist circles by the fact that the 
only Assam-specific policies of the Indian National Congress during the freedom struggle 
were anti-opium resolutions.111  
This severe opinion of Assam became anchored in the highest reaches of the Indian state. 
In a letter to the Chief Ministers in October 1950, Nehru noted that ‘[t]he earthquake and 
after have shaken up Assam. At the same time, I believe, it has done good in the sense that it 
has roused up the people of Assam and made them realise that it is up to them to pull their 
province up’.112 A year later, he had become even harsher. There is no mistaking the tone in 
this letter dated 4 August 1951 to Bishnuram Medhi, Assam’s Chief Minister: 
 
I realise that [your food situation] has suffered greatly from recent happenings in Assam. I feel, however, that 
your Government is not relying on its own resources as much as it ought to. We have become rather slack 
because we think that foreign food has come or is coming. This is a very dangerous attitude of mind [...] After 
all Assam had a big surplus a year ago. There is no reason why it should become so terribly deficit as is made 
out, in spite of floods, etc.113  
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Thus, while relief coming into Assam from all around India and beyond heralded a certain 
consciousness of the region as part of the national space, worthy of sympathy and assistance, 
the aftermath of the earthquake also reinforced stereotypes that would structure centre-state 
relations for decades afterwards. On the one hand, the Government of India’s attitude was 
experienced in Assam as abandonment. Reinforced by the continued under-development of 
the region and the memory of the 1962 Sino-Indian war,114 the ‘step-motherly’ figure of the 
central government is still deeply rooted in the Assamese mental soil.115 On the other hand, 
the stereotype of Assam as a problem region — a state incapable of taking care of itself — 
was seemingly vindicated. Mutual incomprehension between centre and state would only 
increase over the course of the 1950s, notably as a result of a worsening independence war in 
Assam’s Naga Hills District.116  
As far as the Frontier Tracts (officially renamed the North-East Frontier Agency or NEFA 
in 1954) were concerned, the earthquake and its aftermath became a stepping-stone in 
convincing the centre of the inadequacy of ever integrating the region within Assam — a 
scenario envisioned by the Indian constitution. Initially, the earthquake had been an occasion 
for provincial authorities to retain a foot in the Frontier Tracts: in the aftermath of the 
disaster, both relief expediency and the need to assuage Indian public opinion made it 
difficult for the NEFA administration not to resort to the Assam Government’s assistance. 
Assamese leaders, starting with Bishnuram Medhi, had jumped on the opportunity to visit the 
affected hill areas and meet the local populations. They also arranged for relief to be provided 
to affected Adis (Abors) at Dibrugarh.117 The appointment of an Assamese, S.N. Hazarika, as 
Secretary of the Relief and Rehabilitation Committee at Pasighat in the Abor Hills, may have 
represented another success.118  
The collaboration between frontier administration and provincial authorities did not last. 
As 1951 waned, the NEFA administration gradually closed the door momentarily kept ajar. 
Inner Line regulations were once again strictly enforced, causing non-governmental 
organisations and the Assam Government to lose physical access to the frontier. State 
expansion in the eastern Himalayas continued throughout the 1950s, but with an 
administrative cadre increasingly separate from Assam’s bureaucracy, and the provincial 
government saw the Governor and his Adviser's Secretariat becoming increasingly reluctant 
to keep them informed of developments in NEFA. It would take longer for the eastern 
Himalayas to be detached from Assam and turned into a separate territory in 1972, and longer 
still to become the State of Arunachal Pradesh. But after 1950, internal discussions within the 
NEFA administration show less and less evidence of any will to bring about the merger of the 
frontier with Assam.119 
Herein lay all the ‘ambiguities of catastrophe’.120 Even as the earthquake helped to carve 
out a niche space for Assam and its Frontier Tracts in India’s national space, this 
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reconfiguration in parallel entailed that the British Raj’s ‘old imperial frontiers’ became 
naturalised within this Indian national space,121 keeping them hierarchically inferior to, or at 
least on another plane from, the rest of India. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Six decades later, the Assam earthquake remains a vivid memory for many inhabitants of 
Guwahati, Dibrugarh, or Pasighat. On the roadside or on building walls, ubiquitous billboards 
advertise different cement brands. To convince people to build their home in pakka (sturdy) 
material, they sometimes caution against a second 1950. Meanwhile, people have settled 
again in the watery landscape where the Siang, Lohit, and Dibang Rivers meet to form the 
Brahmaputra. A new township, Chapakhowa, has emerged. Yet the Sadiya of old has not 
been forgotten. Submerged as it may be, the former town still gives its name to an 
administrative subdivision in Tinsukia District, and the ferry crossing is called Sadiya Ghat. 
Nor has the image of north-eastern India as a ‘problem region’ died out. If anything, it has 
become even more dominant. The region is now divided into seven states, of which Assam is 
but one. The mention of ‘North-East India’ evokes a series of overwhelmingly negative 
images — the seemingly vicious circle between what the Indian state calls ‘insurgencies’ and 
its own heavy-handed response to these militant movements; fraught ethnic and linguistic 
relations, fuelled by land and migration issues; intractable under-development despite 
plentiful natural resources; and finally, a national security nightmare as a region sandwiched 
between Bhutan, China, Burma, and Bangladesh.122  
In its attempts to delineate North-East India’s spatial, political, and psychological 
marginality within India, scholarship has given pride of place to the genesis and trajectory of 
its various autonomist and independentist movements, and to Delhi’s counter-insurgency 
strategy.123 What is suggested here is that, beyond overtly ‘political’ events like partition or 
armed militancy, multiple historical contingencies contributed to the transformation of old 
colonial Assam into North-East India. The aftermath of the 1950 earthquake is one such 
contingency. It may be that the accidental symbolism of a disaster striking India on its 
independence anniversary heightened reactions to the Assam earthquake. Yet its impact 
should also be read in the context of the early 1950s. A new development and modernisation 
paradigm — embodied in the freshly minted constitution — was then taking root in India, 
sidelining alternative imaginings of the nation while justifying increased state involvement in 
society and economy.124 Relief and rehabilitation were a crucial channel for that involvement. 
How then can the disaster’s legacy help us understand the construction of locality and 
marginality in a border space? Many works discuss the role of the British Raj in fostering this 
isolation — for instance by ‘objectifying the geo-body of India’s North-East’.125 Some also 
point to the devastating effect of partition in turning post-colonial Assam into a landlocked 
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region. Both observations hold true. Yet independence might not be the only significant 
disjuncture for the region. While the geographic contours of today’s North-East India mark it 
out as a ‘geo-political accident’ resulting from partition,126 the re-fashioning of the region’s 
geo-body in this transitional period did not stop there. The earthquake became an opportunity 
to discover an area that was considered a ‘frontier’ in ‘the Indian “civilisational narrative”” 
(from that narrative’s perspective).127 And the resultant trauma reminded many people that, 
even after partition, part of India’s territory still lay beyond the confines of East Pakistan.  
Furthermore, the Assam earthquake underscores that, rather than the product of top-down, 
well-planned strategies, state-making and nation-building are often reactions to extraneous 
events or crises. In turn, this means that state-making and nation-building are much more 
differentiated, convoluted, and contradictory processes than generally thought — all the more 
so at the periphery of large, diverse polities like independent India. Northeast India reminds 
us that the post-colonial as a historical process ‘looks necessarily clumsy, complicated, and 
inherently incomplete (that is, fragmentary)’.128 It is not merely that imperial processes—with 
their hierarchical underpinnings—continue to exist within nation-state projects such as 
India’s:129 it is very much the reproduction of imperial structures of power and hierarchy that 
enables some border spaces to become part of a national space. 
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